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Autonomy, productiveness, and
community: the rise of
inequality in an Amazonian
society
Natalia Buitron London School of Economics and Political Science
In Amazonian societies, autonomy is said to be a core value motivating egalitarian politics. This article
shows how the quest for autonomy and productiveness presently sets in motion processes that
encroach upon these very values. Among the Shuar of Amazonian Ecuador, the realization of
autonomy and productiveness increasingly depends on the capture of state resources. Shuar interact
with the local state as members of relatively recent sedentary communities and through the mediation
of elected leaders. In these processes, ‘community’ itself is transformed: being a channel to regenerate
domestic livelihoods, it also becomes an end in itself, giving rise to new economistic attitudes while
legitimizing inequalities between commoners and leaders. The article suggests that the pursuit of
autonomy and productiveness within a process of village formation is central to the transformation of
egalitarianism that occurs when small-scale Amazonian polities engage with nation-state politics.
On a Sunday morning in 2012, Tiwiram1 took Silverio and me for a tour around his
family’s garden to show us the different varieties of tropical vines that he cultivated with
his wife. The Shuar – who form the largest of the Chicham-speaking2 conglomeration
living on both sides of the Amazonian border between Ecuador and Peru – use these
vines in psychotropic vision quests which grant their seekers a heightened sense of
purpose, power, and predictions for the future. Silverio is a Shuar education officer in
charge of designing curricula to improve the career prospects of indigenous youths.
Tiwiram is a renowned shaman who fights for Shuar territorial self-determination.
Patting a thick vine with his hands, Tiwiram said, ‘This kind of ayahuasca allows you to
see your future career. It shows you if you are going to be a schoolteacher, a politician,
an engineer, anything. Once it shows you your life, there is no return’. Perceiving a hint
of fatalism in Tiwiram’s words, I asked him to tell us more about the career prospects
he had in mind. ‘It’s all the same these days’, he answered, staring intently at the badge
from the education’s ministry on Silverio’s shirt:
Schools now prepare us for peonage. [Once they graduate], we tell our children to find jobs because
we want development. Our authorities give us money and contracts. It’s nonsense. Why can’t we just
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make our own way and create our own forms of work? Maybe it’s not worth it to lose our freedom
for a salary, to be on a contract. It’s called progress, but really it is slavery!
As Silverio and I left, we talked about what Tiwiram had said. Taking a more
pragmatic stance, Silverio told me that Tiwiram may well see it that way but, as a
leader, he is also aware that that’s exactly what his fellows want. ‘Shuar want projects,
contracts, and public works, and this is how, as leaders, we can bring development
to the communities’. Like Silverio, many Shuar are passionate about developing their
villages by equipping them with roads, high schools, infirmaries, football pitches,
electricity, bridges, and all the amenities of development available in big market towns.
In their view, all these public works and services are means to further their own
autonomy and productiveness. However, the development of villages is made possible
through deals with the state which impose new forms of authority and control on Shuar
villagers.
Autonomy and productiveness are core values animating Shuar ideas of the good
life. Autonomy means both the capacity to live with a measure of economic sufficiency
and the freedom to live andwork as one wishes within one’s territory, without following
external orders. Productivenessmeans fecundity andprosperity: the power or efficacy to
regenerate the vital resources that allow one and one’s family to live contentedly. Leaders
must show commitment to local autonomy. Shuar trust that elected leaders will be able
to funnel external resources so that people can live well: that is, autonomously, shaping
their own livelihoods and existences while laying claim to wealth historically controlled
by the apach, as Shuar call mestizo people. Leaders are expected to stake a strong
claim to state resources and to redistribute them among their people while keeping the
government at bay, taming its voracity, preventing it from further encroaching on native
territory and undermining Shuar ways of life. To do this, leaders like Silverio spend a
great deal of their time attending meetings, writing petitions, signing agreements, and
negotiating deals to procure projects and state contracts. Thatmorning in the garden, as
Tiwiram reflected on the visions of new professions and careers, his words encapsulated
the core contradiction of the Shuar struggle for autonomy. This contradiction is
particularly acute for leaders such as Silverio. In the pursuit of autonomy, they not
only become full-time, salary-dependent, and subordinate workers, but, as we shall see,
they simultaneously undermine the autonomy of their people.
In this article, I explore the dilemma of pursuing well-being through resources
that threaten personal autonomy. Why, I ask, do people who value autonomy end up
accepting processes that encroach upon this very value? The thrust of my argument
is that Shuar accept this form of encroachment because the practices and attitudes
required to pursue community development gradually redefine their cherished values
of autonomy and productiveness. While historically anchored in relations of mutuality,
the pursuit of autonomy becomes increasingly dependent on contractual relations
predicated on hierarchy and control. Crucially, the attainment of well-being becomes
gradually attached to the development of public services and facilities provided by
the state through the mediation of elected leaders. As a result, people more willingly
cede control over the tempo, organization, and goals of productive work to supra-
domestic bodies, in stark contrast with the ethos of self-sufficiency that has historically
characterized subsistence production in autonomous domestic units.
These developments complicate our stereotypical understandings of traditionally
egalitarian postcolonial Amazonian societies. Classical studies of sociality and power
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relate Amerindians’ expressed preference for the autonomy of persons and small kin
groups to their egalitarian political ethos, which, followingClastres (1989), is commonly
described as ‘anti-state’. In this view, Amazonian leaders are essentially stripped of any
real power to impose their will on others, because the values and institutions of their
societies systematically undermine the accumulation and/or centralization of power.
The prevalence of autonomy and equality are evident in the way native Amazonians
organize productive processes. It is argued that the autarkic quality of domestic
production fundamentally circumscribes the exercise of political power (Brown 1993:
310). Barring the sexual division of labour, individuals benefit from direct access to the
means of production. Similarly, everyone canmaster the generative skills and life-giving
techniques that guarantee everyday sustenance. As Descola put it with reference to the
Shuar’s neighbours, the Ecuadorian Achuar, ‘[N]o supralocal authority or mediation
could ever threaten the privilege themembers of a household enjoy of reproducing their
own symbolic capacities of intervening in nature’ (1996: 327). A concern for autonomy is
also evident in theway people orchestrate co-operation. As they privilege individualized
modes of procurement, co-ordinated labour in larger groups remains a fluid affair (see,
e.g. Overing 1993: 31). Thus, good leaders privilege strategies of mood management
over strategies of domination since productive sociality is achieved through respect for
individual preferences (Overing 1989: 162-4). According to Overing (2003: 18), in ‘non-
contractual’ societies, such as those of Amazonia, the only contract is the imperative of
extending autonomy to others.
This depiction, however, has largely emerged from the observation of relatively
atomized societies consisting of independent households or slightly larger intimate
sharing groups. Yet over the past decades, many native Amazonian peoples have
experienced a rapid transition from a highly mobile lifestyle based on small, fluid,
politically autonomous family groups to a relatively sedentary life in large, nucleated
communities. These transformations have ensued from a gradual process of state
formation and capital expansion in the region, which has consolidated through
the resettlement of migrant populations, the missionization and territorialization of
native populations, and the development of agro-extractive frontiers. Scholars have
documented how these processes of resettlement and incorporation into the state have
engendered a reconfiguration of nativemodels of territoriality and communitywhereby
fluid social boundaries are being increasingly fixed in corporate and juridical terms
(Rosengren 2003; Rubenstein 2001; Turner 1993). Similarly, legally recognized villages
have made group-level co-operation and contractual obligations more prominent
among people who value personal and domestic autonomy (see, e.g., Erazo 2010; Fisher
2000; Greene 2009; Killick 2008; Sarmiento Barletti 2017).
Recent theoretical contributions have analysed these transformations (Hewlett 2014;
Kelly 2011; Santos-Granero 2015a) with reference to the long-standing ‘openness to the
Other’ and the creation of kinship that characterize Amazonian social life. The starting
point of these analyses is that in native Amazonian cosmologies, the reproduction
of self and kin is symbolically dependent on relations with the outside (Fausto 1999:
934; Overing Kaplan 1981: 163-4). Linking this idea with the importance of conviviality
and equality in social relations (Overing & Passes 2000), some studies trace recent
developments in sedentary villages to long-standing indigenous conceptions of the
good life (Sarmiento Barletti 2015). But while an openness to the other and the pursuit
of the good life are certainly central features of Amazonian sociality, I question whether
we can assume that convivial values are reproduced unchanged while people’s lived
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worlds are dramatically transformed. For example, an emphasis on the continuity of
social values might lead us to expect that the prioritization of autonomy automatically
ensures equality. Yet we know fromwork in other regions that a central challenge facing
so-called ‘egalitarian’ indigenous peoples in their interactions with modern states is to
preserve internal equality while developing centralized forms of leadership that enable
them to confront external pressure (e.g. Boehm 1993: 237; Gulbrandsen 1991). Much
work thus remains to be done to understand the extent to which the dispositions and
desires that individuals cultivate as they incorporate new practices to live well in villages
may lead them to aspire to different social goals.
As such, studies of the meanings and consequences of corporate community and
group autonomy in Amazonia are particularly urgent. They could also provide the basis
for sustained engagements with other regional literatures which have demonstrated
the importance of such forms of organization for indigenous self-determination (e.g.
Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Orta 2013). My aim here is to provide an in-depth analysis of
the implications of village formation for a specific Amazonian group in the past decade.
This, I believe, is an important step towards future comparisons with ongoing research
on indigeneity, and its multiple interconnections with the state in South America and
beyond (Canessa 2018; Postero 2017; Veber & Virtanen 2017).
I argue that Shuar respond to external pressure by resourcefully pursuing domestic
autonomy and well-being. This pursuit, however, creates dependencies, commitments,
and forms of community investment which challenge and reconfigure traditional ways
of achieving autonomy and well-being. To develop this argument, I first describe the
main historical developments that help to explain why Shuar began to embrace the
idea of developing sedentary villages and incorporating state resources, and the recent
prominence of elected leaders in this process. I then examine Shuar understandings
of productiveness and their long-standing preference for autonomous work. I also
show how Shuar channel state resources by mobilizing forms of community work
and the brokering of their leaders. When they channel wealth through projects that
benefit individual families, Shuar can reassert their traditional values of autonomy and
productiveness. By contrast, when they enter into contractual relations with the state
to build public facilities, they project these values onto new forms of community
development, and, as a result, these values get reconfigured. This reconfiguration
supports the emergence of a new logic of production, one that results in labour
specialization and increasingly requires self-reliance in the market, paving the way
to inequalities and stratification.
The rise of community
The livelihoods, desires, and challenges that Shuar experience in the present cannot be
understood unless we consider three interrelated aspects of political centralization
which they have co-produced alongside external agents over the past century:
sedentarization, state integration, and formal leadership. A brief exploration of
these processes will set the context for the long-standing pursuit of autonomy and
productiveness described in the next section.
Shuar have traditionally derived their livelihoods from a combination of slash-
and-burn horticulture, hunting, fishing, and gathering. However, in the Shuar forest
communities of theMakuma areawhere I conducted fieldwork,3 the relative destruction
of the subsistence base caused by nucleation and resource over-exploitation has made
forest self-provisioning less reliable. As a result, people depend on a combination of
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 0, 1-19
C© 2020 The Authors. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of the Royal Anthropological Institute
Autonomy, productiveness, and community 5
subsistence horticulture, cash crop-farming, timber extraction, wage labour, and state-
derived resources.
Historically, Jivaroan social organization has had no centralized political authority
linked to chiefdoms, village communities, or unilineal descent groups. Shuar have
been politically egalitarian, in the sense ‘that people of the same age and sex have
enjoyed equal access to or control over resources, power, and prestige’ (Rubenstein
2001: 266). Up until the 1950s and 1960s, the Shuar of Makuma were semi-mobile and
widely dispersed. Households were spread out along the banks of rivers and formed
fluid bilateral kindred groups linked by marriage alliances; such groups centred on the
influence of one or two ‘great men’ whose authority was restricted to tactical decisions
in times of open hostilities. While marriage alliances and the ‘gravitational pull’
exercised by the greatmen gave some cohesion to these groupings (Taylor 1983: 334), the
household largely operated as a politically independent and economically self-sufficient
unit of production and consumption (Harner 1972: 41; Mader & Gippelhauser 2000:
75).
At least since the 1960s, the majority of Shuar have concentrated in villages called
centros, which literally means ‘centres’ and has the connotation of indigenous sedentary
communities. These communities are administrative and juridical entities recognized
by the Ecuadorian government. As will become apparent, the process of sedentarization
itselfwas thefirst instance inwhich aquest for domestic autonomy resulted innew forms
of dependence. Among the Shuar of Makuma, state and missionary colonization led to
two subsequent phases of sedentarization: in the first phase (1940s-1980s), missionaries
promoted concentration around cattle co-operatives, while, in the second phase, which
extends to the present, Shuar have formed centros and assumed direct control of
relations with the state via ethnic federations and electoral offices. Sedentarization
was triggered by the implantation of Catholic and Evangelical missions and by a series
of agrarian reforms whereby the Ecuadorian government encouraged impoverished
highland peasants to establish privately owned farms in the Amazon to take pressure
off highland cities (Rubenstein 2001: 274). One of these reforms stipulated that to
acquire land titles, an individual or family had to exploit at least two-thirds of the land
in its possession. The result was to force indigenous populations such as the Shuar
‘to imitate the colonists modes of production’ and increasingly rely on mission-and-
state resources, ‘or risk losing all land to the colonists’ (Hendricks 1986: 36). Acting
as an indirect envoy of the state, a North American missionary agency, the Gospel
Missionary Union, conducted the first systematic effort to evangelize the Shuar of
Makuma via the establishment of a mission in 1945.4 To encourage a village-based way
of life, missionaries promoted a strategy of community development centred on cattle-
breeding and on the creation of public infrastructure (e.g. airstrips, mission school,
radio stations, a hydroelectric plant, shops). According to Shuar accounts, the prospect
of acquiring cattle and manufactured goods was the main incentive for settling around
the mission.
With time, the cattle co-operatives also became an instrument of resistance
against land-grabbing from settlers. By becoming cattle-ranchers, Shuar were able
to demonstrate to mestizo authorities that they could put the land to productive
use. The co-operatives provided a model for creating ethnic federations that allowed
Shuar to apply for collective land titles. Titles were only assigned to state-defined
centros. In fact, as I discuss in detail elsewhere (Buitron 2016), since the creation
of federations, membership of centros has determined Shuar access to land, public
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services, and external wealth. And since settling in centros, Shuar relations with
government institutions and representatives have gradually intensified owing to the
decline of forest self-provisioning. Also, since 2012, when the Ecuadorian government
has sought to expand regional extractive industries, Shuar have mobilized against the
prospect of oil field development in Makuma. Pressed to defend their livelihoods
and territories from the intrusion of an encroaching state while also relying more
and more on state resources, Shuar have increasingly participated in the electoral
indigenousmovement at the regional and national levels. Since 2009, they have enjoyed
unprecedented victories in the regional elections, placing Shuar candidates in strategic
offices of the whole province, which previously had been occupied by mestizos. Shuar
expect their elected leaders to act primarily as brokers, capturing and redistributing
valuable resources. There are two kinds of brokers: village-level brokers situated
in centros who cultivate relationships with politicians; and full-time paid officials
elected to higher levels of government expected to divert resources from the state to
centros.
When the co-operatives and centros were created in Makuma and Shuar began to
hold elections, some of the first men elected to public offices were great men who
had established personal links and trading relations with missionaries. One of the key
negotiations between the first generation of nucleated Shuar and the missionaries was
whether parents would send children to the mission school. Many did and, as Shuar
gained independence from the mission, the skills gained by this generation of literate
Shuar became an essential asset for formal leadership. Gradually, the first generation of
trained bilingual teachers replaced the greatmen in public offices. The influence of great
men stemmed fromage, generosity, speaking ability, andprowess inhunting andwarfare
(Hendricks 1986: 62). By contrast, the authority of contemporary leaders depends on
the institutional framework sanctioned by the state. Yet their local influence still derives
from their individual qualities and from their superior knowledge of mestizo society.
Indeed, it is this knowledge that gets them elected. The essential assets for brokering
relations withmainstream politicians derive from literacy and the entrepreneurial skills
acquired through formal education. This is a requirement met only by university-
educated Shuar qualified for white-collar jobs, that is, ‘professionals’ (profesionales), as
villagers call them.
As leaders get electedbeyondvillage-level positions andgain access to greater external
resources, villagers becomemore vigilant about the possibility that their leaders could be
corrupted by the central government. To reflect this, Shuar draw a distinction between
local government levels,where theyhavebeenable to appoint and somewhat successfully
control their officials, and central government, or ‘el gobierno’.When villagers talk about
el gobierno, they have in mind its President5 and his entourage of colonist politicians,
who command inexhaustible riches. Shuar hold the central government responsible
for the mining/oil laws, taxes – all attempts to exploit native lands. Villagers thus want
their officials to procure money from the regional state’s coffers without falling prey
to the central government’s tricks. Sedentarization, state encroachment, and reliance
on formal authorities have impinged on Shuar livelihoods and self-determination –
and have made it necessary for Shuar to find new strategies to guard their autonomy.
I will explore these strategies in detail in later sections, but first I shall examine the
forms of productiveness and autonomy that villagers wish to protect from external
encroachment.
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Autonomy and productiveness
There is no word in Shuar to translate literally what I call ‘autonomy’, but the closest
native term is tarimiat,6 whichdesignates thedomestic core that creates the conditionsof
emplacement, self-determination, andownership necessary to achievewell-being.Well-
being entails personal and domestic autonomy, and both are intimately interrelated
since individual independence presupposes affective and productive relations with kin.
When villagers refer to ‘their own family’ (winia shuar – ‘my family’, ‘my people’), they
typically refer to the members of their household, though the term can encompass
more distant relatives depending on context (e.g. the extended bilateral kin web, all
Shuar people). A household, which typically consists of a husband, one or two wives,
and their unmarried children, creates the condition for prosperity through conjugal
complementarity as well as the forging of core social allianceswith affines.Only through
marriage can a person achieve self-sufficiency by becoming a household owner (jeentin)
and avoid relying on others, a situation that would be tantamount to acknowledging
one’s ineptitude. Shuar emphasize that the best marriages are those in which each
spouse excels in her or his gender-specific sphere of expertise, and when they are united
in pursuit of well-being.
To live well means to keep one’s family away from danger and to generate domestic
sustenance byway ofmultiplying vital resources. Villagers render the latter idea with the
term ipiampamu, whichmeans to foster the growth of crops and domestic animals. The
term also encompasses the growth of the family through the multiplication of children.
The term is routinely translated into Spanish as productividad, that is, productiveness,
in the sense of thriving, fecundity, and abundance.7 An abundance of local food is
necessary to achieve vitality, strength, health, and affective relations with kin. So
how is this achieved? Whether to attain productiveness, social eminence, or, more
generally, a worthwhile existence, individuals must acquire visionary power or strength
(kakarma) by undergoing vision quests following the ingestion of psychotropic plants.
The gendered productive capacities that characterizemature Shuar persons are acquired
via visions/images of domestic prosperity. In the course of these visions, powerful
beings transmit productive skills to the vision-seeker and predict futures of longevity,
fertility, andharmoniousmarriages. Thus, strictly speaking, Shuardonot see themselves
as producing anything directly, since what they do is not the simple acquisition or
transformation of natural resources to satisfy their material needs. Rather, production,
like fertility, hinges on the cultivation of personal relations with powerful beings, both
human and nonhuman (Descola 2012: 459).
To illustrate this: of a middle-aged hard-working woman who had a thriving
household, people said that ‘she had a lot of power because she suffered fasting before
taking datura when she was young and learnt many incantations’. With this they meant
that the woman had performed the propitiatory rites that enabled her to establish
successful relations with Nunkui, the garden spirit, who controls the fertility of plants,
domestic animals, and humans. It is useful to think of the combination of hard labour
and visionary power to generate productiveness as a form of ‘efficacious work’. So, to
be successful and efficacious – whether in planting or hunting – people must have a
range of knowledge and skills: they must know about the plants and game, and know
how to interpret dreams, fast and observe sexual abstinence, manipulate charms and
sing incantations. Ultimately, the multiplication of vital resources hinges on the ability
to tap external, creative powers and to interact with a panoply of master/owners who
oversee different spheres of abundance. Shuar represent these interactions as predatory
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in character, as they involve the use of specialized language and techniques to captivate
powerful others in order that they relinquish vital goods. In more recent times, such
beings include Christian deities, missionaries, mestizo bosses, and state agents: that
is, all the powerful allies-patrons who oversee coveted resources such as domesticated
animals and seeds, manufactured goods, money, and technology. As people transact
with different sorts of powerful entities, different languages and techniques are required.
Shuar establish an intimate link between technical and symbolic mastery, so that a
person’s technical ability to access exotic goods reflects his or her superior visionary
power. As will be shown later, it is the desire to incorporate the efficacious power
of the state that drives the work of developing villages (both bureaucratically and
infrastructurally).
Therefore, a desire to enhance autonomy guides the relations Shuar establish with
the outside, evenwhile they seek to harness its regenerative powers. In this, Shuar follow
a well-known Chicham inclination to evade becoming like outsiders, aiming instead at
mastering the latter’s sources of power and effectively ‘competingwith themat their own
game’ (Taylor 2007: 134, 144-5). Taylor (1981: 672) offers a historical example of this when
she observes that the Achuar in the mid-1970s sought to bypass missionary mediation
by learning prayers and invoking God to give themGod-wealth, that is, cattle. For Shuar
today, to seek direct access to the sources of mestizo’s welfare makes even more sense
because not everything the apach possess leads to the forms of autonomy and balanced
relations villagers consider desirable. An example is useful here. One day a group of
parents from the village of Kuamar gathered to welcome the supervisor of education,
also a Shuar man. During the meeting, they complained about the school breakfast,
which consists of a daily ration of powdered milk and granola that schoolchildren
received as part of the government’s nation-wide food programme. They described the
breakfast as ‘mixed up’. According to some, the government was trying to poison their
children. Another parent stated that the problem did not simply concern the breakfast,
but otherapach foodstuffs villagerswere eating,which, inhis view,weremaking children
grow deformed and develop bad thoughts. So, the villager said: ‘We can’t wait until the
government sends us biscuits and sardines and be content. We have to work ourselves,
we have to multiply our resources!’ Upon everyone’s request, the supervisor was asked
to demandmoney from the authorities so that villagers could directly procure their own
selected food and prepare it at home. What this example illustrates is that ultimately
well-being is about achieving self-sufficiency both in concrete terms – being able to eat
one’s own food – and in terms of efficacious work: that is, by controlling the specialized
avenues to access valuable resources – in this case, government’s budgets. Only thus
can villagers attain productiveness without compromising their autonomy: that is, their
ability to live and work freely or unencumbered by external pressures and dangers.
In fact, to live well, Shuar need not only the generative skills to live self-sufficiently,
but also the freedom to choose how, when, and with whom to work. Productiveness
therefore encompasses the idea thatworkmust cater to personalmoods andpreferences.
The same applies to inter-household co-operation. While villagers try to help their
fellows if asked to, by lending tools or aworking hand, they are also at pains to emphasize
the voluntary and spontaneous character of such aid. Requests for help are most often
framed as pleasurable invitations to spend time together, always leaving the space for
others to opt out without feeling embarrassed. It is this subtle blending of mutual aid
and autonomy that characterizes informalworkparties (mingas8).Mingas are preferably
carried out among sibling and affinal households and are generally conducted in an
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atmosphere of playful sociability – spiced by loads of food, manioc beer, laughter, and
conversation.
But can Shuar preserve this sort of flexibility and practical autonomy when working
with state resources in villages? To harness state wealth, they face considerable pressure
to come together as a community and to enter into obligatory forms of commitment
vis-a`-vis fellow villagers and state officials, which have the potential to overshadow
voluntary forms of mutual aid. Still, there is some evidence that they can uphold their
values, specifically through their use of mingas, to benefit from state projects. In such
cases, they mobilize the community to generate wealth while loosening its grip to
maintain domestic autonomy.
De-collectivizing community projects
One of the ways in which Shuar tap into state resources is by channelling ‘productive
projects’: state-sponsored schemes geared towards the local production of cash
crops, animal husbandry, and other income-generating activities. Public resources,
including projects, are offered to indigenous populations only if they are organized
in legally constituted centros which can demonstrate ‘good public government’. The
disbursement of private and public monies to indigenous peoples is largely premised
on the assumption that community-based development projects are preferable to
family/individual-based projects. This is because they are thought to enhance fiscal
responsibility while being tailored to indigenous people’s alleged ‘communistic’ ethos.
Thus, much of the work done by villagers is aimed at mastering the techniques
of government required to access projects. Shuar elect formal leaders, run village
assemblies, manage community funds, write petitions, and attend project workshops.
They have also become socios (associates or partners), a new category of political
membership used to refer to the commitments and affiliations they have acquired as
a result of living in centros. Villagers also care immensely about training the future
brokers of centros, which they do by sending their children to school so that they can
acquire the knowledge necessary to run villages. As an elderly man bluntly stated in
a school meeting, ‘If there aren’t going to be Shuar capable of writing petitions and
drumming up resources, we might as well drop the community’. When villagers deploy
the term ‘community’, often via the Spanish comunidad, or conveniently translated into
the Shuar term irutkamu,9 they refer to the village membership group or the kind of
‘we’ that emerges from the relations and specialized skills required to funnel wealth and
develop public works in centros. This statement reveals the widespread perception that
the community is a sort of vehicle: a set of knowledge practices and symbolic techniques
that Shuar require for funnelling resources and living well.
Villagers conceive of projects as their own productive work. Indeed, they call them
‘work’ (takat), just like gardening.And just like gardening,work for the projects ismeant
to create productiveness and ensure autonomy. This makes sense because villagers are
not only doing the hard work of growing the cocoa crops and raising the animals given
as part of the projects, but they are also involved in controlling the symbolic techniques
required to persuade state agents to release these coveted resources. A closer look at the
way the villagers of Kuamar dealt with one such venture will shed light on the ways
Shuar reassert personal and domestic autonomy while enacting ‘community work’.
One morning, the people of Kuamar welcomed a group of technical trainers from the
provincial government who came to run a reforestation workshop. Lots of people came
to the village’s communal house curious to learn how on earth one could find any use
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 0, 1-19
C© 2020 The Authors. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd on behalf of the Royal Anthropological Institute
10 Natalia Buitron
in planting more trees when there were so many already in the forest. The head of the
trainers started by briefing the assembly about the different phases of implementation
of the tree nurseries, before introducing a few methods for carrying out ‘community
work’. She instructed villagers about the importance of using worksheets to develop a
rota system to distribute daily tasks: watering the plants, weeding the plots, and so on.
At this point, Marco, the broker who had invited the trainers, intervened to clarify that
‘since his family would be responsible for all the work, the worksheets and all those
methods wouldn’t be necessary’. A bit confused by this intervention, the trainer insisted
that the project would require ‘community work’, reasoning that ‘a family alone is not
going to be able to sustain all the necessary work’. In her experience, she said, ‘these
projects tended to fail because people don’t commit to work together’. At this point, the
President of Kuamar felt compelled to intervene. He said:
Look, Mrs Engineer, in the past we have tried this community method you’re suggesting but it just
doesn’t work for us. At first, everyone says, ‘We will work together’ and then nobody shows up.
Here every family is responsible for its own thing. We have granted permission to Marco to do this
project and if he calls a minga, we will do minga with him; but every one of us has other [household]
responsibilities to mind.
In the end, everyone treated the project as Marco’s rather than the community’s and
villagers came to his aid when he called mingas. The organization of spontaneous
mingas reveals a great deal about how ‘community work’ is locally appropriated. In
mingas, participants help other families but do not share responsibility for the outcome
of the work or for the use of resources. Co-participants, therefore, do not become
co-proprietors and, as a result, they can never control the labour of others. So, whilst
villagers perform ‘community work’ – for example, by attending the meetings and
workshops necessary to funnel resources – they also try to de-collectivize the actual
implementation of projects to preserve domestic and personal autonomy.
The style of co-operation in voluntary groups is significantly different from the
centralized rota system proposed by the trainers. The rota system presupposes that
someone takes responsibility for assigning and overseeing the work; that everyone
shares responsibility for the general outcome or that someone becomes responsible for
controlling the work of others and for dividing labour among them, so that each carries
out a task at a specified time in the pursuit of efficiency. Thus, whilst the people of
Kuamar do depend on one another to attract and manage state wealth derived from
projects, they reassert the value of freedom inwork over the forms of communal control
promoted by development agents. As shown by the example of the reforestation project,
they do so by following pre-existent principles of co-operation, thereby choosing a form
of mutual aid that remains voluntary, can be terminated at any point, and preserves the
personal autonomyof all participants.However, there are occasionswhen villagers enter
into more contractual obligations, which introduce less negotiable external controls.
The rise of contractual relations
Analternativemeans to access statemonies is through thedevelopment of infrastructure
in Shuar centros. In indigenous accounts of village formation across the world,
a compelling reason for embracing sedentary life is the bodily and material
transformation that villages facilitate through improved access to consumer goods
and/or infrastructural development (Killick 2008; Rival 2002: 161-6; Stasch 2013). This
resonates with the reasons the Shuar of Makuma provide for their embrace of village
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life. Even after the dissolution of the cattle co-operatives, the people of Makuma
chose to remain nucleated in centros to continue to benefit from services and public
infrastructure and to ensure that their children could attend school. The popularity of
public works such as schools, trails, and football pitches has to do with having direct
access to the amenities found in towns without having to put up with the expenses and
troubles of living amongmestizos. But public works are also popular because they create
direct opportunities to access cash through public contracts, even if these introduce
new forms of subordination and inequality among Shuar people themselves.
Public contractswork as follows. A village-level broker embarks on the usual business
of funnelling state resources, but instead of securing a project which procures resources
that can easily be de-collectivized (seeds, barnyard animals, etc.), he or she gets a
contract from a Shuar official working in one of the local governments for a public
work that targets the whole community (school and trail improvements, etc). Only
individuals, rather than whole communities, can become contractors, even though, to
carry out the work, a contractor employs other people in the community. And since
a contractor usually receives full payment upon completion and external auditing of
the work, the broker-cum-contractor is prompted to impose conditions and deadlines
upon people’s performance of the work. Further, the system of deferred payment gives
the upper hand to officials, since they draft the terms of the contract. So, to benefit from
state resources through contracts, villagers are turned into daily labourers, subject to
external orders and conditions.
At times, the contract systemmayengender a chainofother informaldeals,with every
contractor underpaying labourers at the next level. This resembles what Hugh-Jones
(1992: 69) observed among the Barasana Indians, who passed on to their relatives the
informal work debts that they had contracted with mestizo cocaine dealers and rubber
gatherers, by disguising themunder ties of kinship and affinity. The difference is that the
patrons are Shuar officials and that the practice is legitimized by invoking community
development. AsGudeman shows, whilemutuality and trade are two different strategies
of production, ‘they may subsume, veil . . . or absorb features of the other’ (2008: 14).
For instance, on one occasion, a Kuamar villager enlisted the support of his mother and
sisters-in-law to help him with a contract to build a trench to transport water to the
schoolhouse. He paid them less than 50 per cent of his total contract gain. In turn, the
women enlisted the help of other young (unmarried) men to finish the work faster and
rewarded them with manioc beer: that is, the women were treating the extra labourers
as if they had been summoned to a minga. We thus see here the potential for mutual aid
to support the multiplication of contractual obligations, which are partly neutralized
(via mingas), but which also aggravate differences in wealth and power that impinge
upon the autonomy (and productiveness) of others.
In fact, contracts reinforce a trend towards accumulation started by salaried workers.
A new class of Shuar professionals (composed of state officials and schoolteachers)
distinguish themselves by accumulating cattle, renovating houses, and buying sound
systems, home appliances, and cars. Professionals are unceasingly demanded to share
with kin and neighbours. Increasingly, however, professionals use their salaries to ‘help’
others by hiring them to do the farming work they no longer have the time to do.
Villagers covet these paid jobs because they give themaccess to cash to pay for non-forest
products, domestic emergencies, and thenew services offered in the community. Thanks
to the commissions they receive, contractors have joined this group of professionals by
becoming occasional money lenders and work suppliers in villages. Not surprisingly,
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therefore, Shuar now routinely distinguish between professionals, with the knowledge
to generate money, and villagers, who can only access money through their ties to
professionals. Implicit in this distinction is the idea that professionals enact more
‘efficacious work’ than ordinary villagers thanks to their superior skills, which enable
them to funnel money and public works into the community.
Given the intimate connection between generative capacities and production and
the importance of personal autonomy in the organization of work, why do villagers
agree to such deals mediated by contracts and wages, which clearly create inequalities
and dependence? I suggest a couple of interrelated reasons. The first is that people
really value performing work to develop villages. As we have seen, villagers prefer
to use the minga system when implementing productive projects. But there are also
a few occasions when they agree to work collectively for a third party in return for
compensation in pursuit of community goals. However, agreements of this sort can
also be ‘colonized’ by the logic of the contract. For example, to celebrate a festival,
the villagers of Pampants requested a cow from a Shuar rancher, who donated it on
the condition that villagers would clear two hectares of his field. The cattleman asked
to have the agreement written down as an ‘act of commitment’ (acta de compromiso)
lest, he said, ‘villagers would forget their obligation once the fun of the festival lay
behind them’. This type of work straddles the boundary between minga and contract:
while the transaction becomes increasingly formalized with a legal authority implicitly
guaranteeing the deal, villagers retain relative autonomy in how theywork and the equal
distribution of the rewards among everyone. The public contract, by contrast, enables
the broker to accumulate on behalf of the community while specifying conditions for
the performance of the work. It is striking, all the same, that villagers are enthusiastic
about contracts. This is because, when a new public work is built, the community is
made bigger, it becomes more organized, more beautiful, and, as a result, the leader
is seen as engendering productiveness. I am thus suggesting that, in addition to the
occasional income villagers can earn, the contract’s final product, the beautiful and
highly desirable public work, significantly contributes to legitimizing the inequality
between contractor and labourer.
Villages require a continuous inflow of work and resources to go on existing. They
are made more permanent by an increasing number of public works and services. Most
publicworks are built in the centre of the village, an area that villagers call ‘urbanization’.
‘The urbanization enlivens the community!’ as they say. Indeed, it is in the urbanization
that people gather to play football, host festivals, discuss political nominations, and run
workshops. If theurbanizationof villagesdoesnot lookwellmaintainedanddeveloped–
for example, if it lacks a school, or the central plaza is not weeded – visitors will see
this as showing a lack of organization, which reflects badly on the ‘good government’
that villagers aim to demonstrate. This commitment to making villages big, beautiful,
and developed reveals a shifting understanding of community. In the previous section,
I showed that the community is primarily mobilized as an instrument to gain access
to valuable external resources with which to generate domestic prosperity. But some
of the channels through which Shuar access state resources directly target community
development. This is the case for contracts through which individual villagers procure
cash for their families while helping to improve general conditions in the village via
public facilities. Increasingly, therefore, the space of the village takes on a bigger role in
people’s images of the good life. Thus, from being a means to achieve productiveness,
it becomes a form of productiveness – it becomes an end in and of itself.
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Consequently, villagers assess autonomy not only in relation to freedom in work
and their productive capacities but also in relation to their freedom to engender
and enjoy development: the enhancements that public infrastructures bring to their
lives. In this scenario, the benefits of economic redistribution obtained via contracts
outweigh the rewards of freedom in work, making subordination to elected officials,
if not desirable, then more legitimate. Contracts are legal instruments through
which mutual aid is co-opted and productive autonomy is ultimately subordinated
to the goal of community development. But of more significance here is that
contracts also pave the way for the cultivation of new economic attitudes while
simultaneously building on villagers’ preference for extending autonomy to their
fellows.
New economic attitudes
One of the key challenges faced by Shuar officials is to comply with the framework of
accountability of the institutions they serve: for example, the requirement to audit the
allocation of public resources. Brokers are aware that changes in local attitudes would
be necessary for villagers to comply with such a framework. For instance, one day I
accompanied Silverio – the official we encountered at the start – to an informal political
meeting where his allies proffered some advice with regard to ‘how to speak to fellow
Shuar during electoral campaigns’. One of the politicians told Silverio that he needed
to persuade villagers that the best way officials could serve their electorate was not by
providing them with projects but through the audit of public works. In other words,
the politician was trying to reconfigure the role of wealth purveyor which villagers have
assigned to their leaders, in order to assume an overseeing role more appropriate to his
functions as state official.
Leaders deploy ingenious ways of stressing the importance of accountability to Shuar
villagers. For example, during a festival celebrated in the community of Pampants, the
President of the parish proffered a lecture seeking to inculcate in villagers the value of
gratitude. Through an amusingnarrative, he told villagers ‘that they didn’t showenough
gratitude to their leaders’. Shuar have ‘inverted thoughts’, he said, because instead of
thanking those who help them, they criticize them. He then compared the villagers’
attitudes to the behaviour of a mythical woman called Auju, who personifies gluttony.
In the well-known myth, Auju is transformed into a potoo bird and condemned to cry
on full-moon nights. She received this punishment after her husband, the Sun (Etsa),
discovered that she had been eating ripe squashes while cleverly denying him dinner.
Just like Auju, the President said, Shuar eat the goods they receive but do not want to
make them grow.
With stories such as this one, leaders try to invert the direction of power and
accountability: instead of leaders having to demonstrate their loyalty to villagers,
villagers should be thankful to their leaders for the goods they receive from them.
The accountability promoted by the leaders does not simply imply that Shuar should
commit to clearly defined conditions of work, as in the case of contracts, or to be
responsible and ensure good management of the resources they receive, as in the case
of projects. It also means that Shuar should commit to progress: that is, they should
change their mode of work so that they can gradually sell their foodstuffs and replenish
their subsistence base. Leaders continually encourage villagers to work harder so that
they will be able to sell their produce and make money. In so doing, they strive to
promote a different understanding of growth and productiveness.
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As I mentioned, villagers want to multiply their crops and animals to generate
productiveness. Locally, productiveness is geared towards the well-being of the family;
it is ameans to support each household. Villagers deploy a folkmodel of self-sufficiency
whereby they continuously replenish their subsistence base through a combination of
hard work and the mastery of relations with powerful others in control of external
wealth. This is an effort undertaken day by day which has little room for future reserves
and none for accumulation. As they work andmanage resources, Shuar villagers do not
follow a conscious maximizing strategy. By contrast, the growth that leaders promote,
while emphasizing the value of self-sufficiency, entails the optimization of resource
management and the increase of work productivity – this with the goal ofmaking Shuar
self-reliant in the market. The leaders with whom I have discussed these issues think
that this model is the way forward as it would allow villagers to become independent
from state wealth and pay for the community services they are so keen to acquire.
The model of self-reliance that leaders have in mind is, of course, based on entirely
different economic premises, for it presupposes that Shuar would become either full-
time commercial farmers or salaried workers. Hence, from being a means to achieve
autonomy, the village itself with all its facilities and services increasingly turns into a
kind of public good that activates new forms of subordination to larger powers.
In the same vein, contracts are now popular because individuals are free to enter into
them directly without receiving the authorization of other villagers. The contractual
system of procurement can therefore appear to be highly compatible with personal
and domestic autonomy. But, of course, the kind of autonomy elicited by contracts is
tied to forms of obligation which harbour a significant coercive potential. Contractors
cannot impose conditions alone; they require administrative power and institutional
authority: government, laws, prisons, and police – all instruments which are nowwithin
the range of Shuar officials delivering contracts. Yet villagers are receptive to the ideals
of development propagated by officials. As their communities grow and new facilities
and services create novel forms of obligations, they are increasingly inclined to work
for payment, even at the cost of compromising autonomy and mutuality. For instance,
once when I was returning home from a minga with Marco, my host father, he told me
that one of his brothers-in-law, Dionisio, was not in the minga because he had started
working for a contractor in another community. This fact made Marco consider how
one should go about working and living well. Thinking out loud, he said:
In a few months Dionisio might be able to buy a car, so he’s right to take so many contracts . . . As I
see it, education everywhere is teaching people how to make money, it’s teaching them to produce. I
have seen in my visions that Kuamar will be a large city, so we will need more and more people like
Dionisio who can maintain the city and offer new services. In fact, who is going to be responsible for
the city? Our children will. Therefore, we have to think seriously about productiveness.
Marco’s words reveal a change to the notion of productiveness which suggests that ‘to
think seriously about it’ will involve creating the kind of people who can enter into
contractual deals to make money.
Conclusion
Shuar’s increasing reliance on the Ecuadorian state can be explained through their
pursuit of domestic autonomy and productiveness. This pursuit crucially hinges on
electing leaders who can funnel external wealth while keeping the state’s extractive
potential at bay. Yet this process – that is, the channels through which leaders and
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villagers incorporate and multiply the effects of external wealth in their villages –
gradually transforms the very content of these values.While Shuar villagers aim to foster
domestic self-sufficiency and regenerate local livelihoods, themeans throughwhich they
do so result in new ways of engaging with leaders and entering into contractual deals.
As Shuar reassert group autonomy vis-a`-vis the dominant society, they simultaneously
legitimize internal differentials of power and wealth between followers and leaders
and thereby break the intimate link between autonomy and egalitarianism that has
characterized small-scale Amazonian polities.
Egalitarianism in small kin groups results from a situation where everyone has
access to the generative skills which guarantee everyday sustenance and confer status.
Individuals rather than corporate groups control the means and forces of production
even while they must harness these from the outside. Correspondingly, the use of
these skills in everyday productive processes prioritizes the autonomy necessary to
create enjoyable social relations (Overing 1989: 164; Rival 2002: 99-100). This unique
combination of autonomy and conviviality implies that even while some individuals
can acquire greater productive powers, they cannot, as a result, monopolize resources
or control the labour of others. Rather, as Overing (1989: 172) observes, those who
develop more productive skills within themselves than ordinary people, have greater
responsibilities than laymen for building the community.
While, traditionally, greater political and ritual power could not be transformed
into economic advantage, the specific processes of wealth capture and village formation
I have discussed here present a transformation of classical Amazonian intra-group
sociality. The professionals responsible for funnelling wealth to build the public space
of villages now are increasingly able to convert their generative powers into economic
advantage and political control: for example, over desirable resources and the labour
of others. These findings contrast with recent anthropological analyses which illustrate
how contemporary leaders are largely able to secure access to desirable resources in
pursuit of internal well-being and egalitarian relations. For instance, in an edited
volume devoted to the concept of ‘public wealth’, Santos-Granero (2015b: 15) argues
that while new forms of wealth (from development monies to public infrastructures)
‘have radically altered the capacity for wealth accumulation’, they have not changed
howAmazonians ‘perceivematerial accumulation’: that is, as something which acquires
value insofar as it engenders well-being and thereby expresses attitudes of compassion,
generosity, and care. The Shuar case introduces a corrective into this picture and
illustrates how the dispositions and desires that individuals cultivate as they incorporate
corporate wealth linked to a village way of life (e.g. acquiring contracts, aspiring to
progress, thanking leaders) can in turn redefine convivial values.
This analysis further demonstrates how significant changes can nevertheless occur
within a framework that prioritizes continuity. As London˜o Sulkin (2017) maintains,
moral selfhood and sociality in the region are often shaped by and reproduce versions
of what he calls the ‘Amazonian package’: for example, the idea that the achievement
of a desirable life depends on cultivating relations with powerful but dangerous others.
To procure state resources, Shuar mobilize their own ideas of ‘efficacious work’: that
is, the understanding that one must engage with Others by mastering their specialized
techniques of power. This is what induces Shuar to engage in a form of antagonistic
appropriation of mestizo trappings, which they do by enacting practices of communal
governance which, being central to how the Ecuadorian state engages with indigenous
people, become central to how they seek to persuade state patrons to relinquish wealth
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(see also Deshoullie`re 2016). But the way Shuar do this also reveals the importance of
differentiating between the diverse mechanisms whereby resources are appropriated
and deployed.
Villagers switch back and forth between different understandings and usages of
community. Sometimes the community is simply a channel to access external wealth.
When this happens, villagers reassert their own rationale in managing state wealth,
resorting to a combination of autonomy and mutual aid to organize internal work.
Leaders can mediate but cannot impose conditions on the inflow of wealth and the
arrangement of work. By contrast, when leaders control the distribution of wealth
through contracts, they can impinge on the productive autonomy of their constituents
and co-opt mutuality for the sake of development. Here, the ‘community’ has become
an end in itself. Finally, the community also becomes a means towards the cultivation
of new economic attitudes. Indeed, villagers see the ability of leaders and neighbours to
‘make profit’ as an important collective asset which can contribute to the upkeep and
development of their communities. At this point, autonomy takes on an aspirational
character, more akin to the orthodox view advanced in capitalist settings where self-
interest and individuals’ fortunes are said to drive the economy and promote general
well-being despite contributing to entrenching inequalities.
I have shown that this is possible because villagers increasingly project their capacities
to pursue well-being (and indeed their attainment of autonomy and productiveness)
onto the development of villages. By linking their productive capacities and pursuit of
autonomy to the production of ever more durable villages, Shuar extend not only the
spatial but also the temporal horizons of their regenerative projects. While reproducing
persons and households, Shuar also begin to reproduce larger institutions such as
villages and, through them, material and status inequality. Infrastructurally equipped
centros are not only harder to move and too expensive to leave; they also generate
dependency and considerable temporal commitment. Not surprisingly, elected officials
insist on the importance of commitment in their lessons to villagers.
Importantly, inequalities stabilize in Shuar society, not because leaders turn against
society, as Clastres (1994: 116) would argue, but rather because, through their brokering
and interpretative work, Shuar leaders help to shape the very notion of a separate
society: the public space of villages Shuar are increasingly passionate about and willing
to work for. Yet it is possible that future visions will increasingly bring forth pessimistic
images of unbearable dependence, such as those evoked by Tiwiram at the start of this
article. A crucial question is thus whether the capacity to generate productiveness at
the level of the village will be experienced in the valuable forms of efficacious work and
self-sufficiency. ‘We Shuar are very few if compared to the mestizo’, a Shuar leader told
me one day, closing his sentence with the telling remark: ‘but beware, we’re also very
talented!’ Visions of the future, then, will depend on the talents, forms of efficacy, and
careers Shuar will continue to cultivate.
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and Hans Steinmu¨ller, for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. My warmest gratitude goes to my
Shuar friends and hosts.
1 All personal names in this article are pseudonyms.
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2 Previously known as ‘Jivaroan’ (see Deshoullie`re & Utitiaj in press). Here I follow the new convention
using ‘Chicham’ to refer to the linguistic family, which also includes the Achuar, Awajun, Shiwar, and
Wampis.
3 I have conducted a total of twenty-three months of fieldwork in the southeastern Ecuadorian foothills in
the province of Morona Santiago (2011-13 and 2018), within a network of villages in the Makuma area, and
settled in a village called Kuamar, which numbers approximately 170 people.
4 For accounts of sedentarization promoted by Salesian missionaries, see Descola (1982) and Rubenstein
(2001).
5 The incumbent for most of my fieldwork period was Rafael Correa, who served from January 2007 to
May 2017. He was succeeded by Lenı´n Moreno, also from the PAIS Alliance.
6 Tarimiat also denotes the first wife. Leaders use the expression tarimiat pujustin (foundational or good
living) with reference to territorial self-determination.
7 To describe Shuar ideas of regeneration, I prefer ‘productiveness’ to ‘productivity’, which is the economic
measure of productive effort calculated in terms of output per unit of input.
8 From the Kichwa minka, the name for collective work of obligatory character, a fact that has led
some ethnographers to suggest that its adoption among Chicham groups reflects a transformation ‘in
the representation of the relations of solidarity’ (Descola 1982: 232) and of ‘work’ (Hendricks 1988:
226). Shuar adopted the institution when they created cattle cooperatives; prior to that they designated
interhousehold work parties as ‘an invitation to work’ (takat iniampramu). See Buitron (2016: 171) for a
discussion of the overlaps between the practices associated with these different institutions in contemporary
villages.
9 From the verb (irut-), which expresses ideas of gathering and reuniting, and sometimes settling.
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Autonomie, productivite´ et communaute´ : l’essor de l’ine´galite´ dans une
socie´te´ amazonienne
Re´sume´
L’autonomie est pre´sente´e comme une valeur centrale motivant des politiques e´galitaires dans les socie´te´s
amazoniennes. Le pre´sent articlemontre comment la queˆte d’autonomie et deproductivite´met aujourd’hui
en branle des processus qui compromettent ces valeurs meˆmes. Chez les Shuars d’Amazonie e´quatorienne,
la re´alisation de l’autonomie et de la productivite´ de´pend de plus en plus de la captation de ressources
e´tatiques. Les Shuars interagissent avec l’E´tat local en tant quemembres de communaute´s assez re´cemment
se´dentarise´es et par l’interme´diaire de chefs e´lus. Par ces processus, la « communaute´ » elle-meˆme se
transforme : de canal de re´ge´ne´ration des moyens de subsistance domestiques, elle devient aussi une fin en
soi, suscitant de nouvelles attitudes e´conomistes tout en justifiant les ine´galite´s entre la population et les
chefs. L’article sugge`re que la poursuite de l’autonomie et de la productivite´ dans le cadre d’un processus
de formation de villages est au cœur de la transformation de l’e´galitarisme qui se produit lorsque les petites
collectivite´s amazoniennes s’engagent dans la politique de l’E´tat-nation.
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